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Abstract Firms enter cartels (e.g. price-fixing; bid-rigging) in order to control market uncer-
tainties and gain collusive profits, but face challenges in controlling the cartel itself. A
challenge for business cartels is how to organise collective illegal activities without the use
of formal control, such as binding legal contracts or arbitration. While one might expect that a
lack of formal legal control leads to mutual conflicts and opportunistic behaviour resulting in
short-lived cartels, firms often manage to continue their illegal conduct for years. This raises
questions as to how firms organise their cartels in the absence of legal means. This article
addresses how informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope of
formal legal control. Based on an in depth study of 14 Dutch cartels, this article shows the
importance of informal social mechanisms to coordinate, monitor, enforce, and compensate for
the longevity of business cartels. Furthermore, the results emphasise that in order to explain
cartel stability, social mechanisms that induce trust need to be considered.
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Introduction
Business cartels are an example of corporate and economic crime that entail collusion between
competitors to fix prices, divide markets, or rig tendering procedures (Friedrichs 2010; Stewart
2007; Geis 1987). Cartels initially enable firms1 to minimalise uncertainties and the risks of a
competitive market. However, once in a cartel, firms face various external and internal threats
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to the cartel itself. Internal threats involve cheating, not complying with the cartel, and
defection, insiders denouncing the cartel using leniency.2 Cartelists need to deal with these
threats in an informal setting. In other words, cartels require collective action, but participants
have to operate subversively, against the background of increasing criminalisation3 of this
conduct in recent years. Cartelists are therefore unable to formulate binding contracts or resort
to legal conflict resolution in the event of broken agreements.
Business cartels are, in that sense, comparable to organized crime. From organized crime
literature, we know that non-violent forms of dispute settlement are common and often prove
to be a less costly business tool than violence, in illegal contexts (Paoli 2003; Zaitch 2002).
Violent retaliation can attract unwanted attention from authorities and harm ‘business’ relations
and reputations of reliability in illegal markets (Zaitch 2005). Studies on drug markets show
that non-violent retaliation in the form of negotiation, avoidance and toleration reduces the
costs of conflict and is widespread (Jacques and Wright 2008, 2011). In analogy to the study of
organized crime, the aim of this article is to investigate how legitimate firms manage their
illegal agreements with others and how they deal with the risks of cheating, free riding and
defection.
The question how firms manage to stabilise cartels has received limited attention in
criminological literature. There are some criminological white-collar crime studies on cartel
conduct, like the seminal study of Geis (1987) on price-fixing in the heavy electrical equip-
ment industry. These studies explain cartel conduct by a need to manage and avoid uncer-
tainties, make results more predictable and minimise risks (Agnew et al. 2009; Paternoster and
Simpson 1996; Jamieson 1994; Geis 1987; Sonnenfeld and Lawrence 1978). However, these
studies do not adopt a longitudinal perspective to cartels. To the extent that studies do adopt a
longitudinal approach to white-collar crime, they focus on the individual life course, instead of
on co-offending (Piquero and Weisburd 2009; Piquero 2012; Weisburd and Waring 2001).
In economic literature, numerous studies do focus on how firms manage to stabilize cartels
(Harrington 2006; Hinloopen 2006; Ashenfelter and Graddy 2005; Spagnolo 2000; Spar 1994;
Stigler 1968). Economists mostly perceive cartels as ‘inherently unstable’, focusing on the
incentives to cheat and means of retaliation in order to prevent cheating. The image of cartels
as ‘inherently unstable’ is influential and underpins competition law and policy. Accordingly,
the legal debate focuses on raising regulatory pressure in order to destabilise existing cartel
agreements. This inherent instability is not in line with the empirical evidence of the duration
of cartels. Cartels manage to exist for years—even decades (Levenstein and Suslow 2006;
Leslie 2008; Connor 2010; Connor and Helmers 2007)—and they often comprise a relatively
large number of participating firms (Connor 2010). The criminalisation project therefore seems
ill informed by a proper understanding of the operation of business cartels (Beaton-Wells and
Haines 2010; Harding 2006; Harding and Joshua 2003: 284).
This article contributes to a more complete understanding of the operation of cartel stability,
by addressing the question how cartels operate in secrecy, confronted with coordination
problems and instability and how they deal with mutual disagreements in the absence of legal
2 Leniency is a whistleblowing instrument through which firms can come forward to competition authorities with
substantial evidence regarding the cartel in return for sanction immunity or waivers of prosecution.
3 Since the late 1990s, most countries introduced administrative penalties, and some countries have imposed
criminal sanctions for cartel conduct (Beaton-Wells 2008; Ottow 2012). Today, scholars speak of a global trend
of cartel criminalisation, with more than 30 countries worldwide using criminal law to sanction cartels and most
other countries, the European Union and its member states in particular, having increased the level of fines
significantly over the last two decades (Harding et al. 2015; Shaffer and Nesbitt 2011).
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means. To review the scholarship on cartel stability, it is helpful to distinguish two directions of
thought. The first and most dominant approach is an economic one that focuses on a lack of
trust between cartelists and on their individual incentives to cheat. The second approach is a
social one that focuses on the impact of social mechanisms that enable trust between cartelists.
As regards cartel stability, these contrasting approaches result in two explanatory models that
generate different expectations as to how members stabilise their cartels in the absence of legal
means.
In an empirical manner, this article investigates different responses of cartelists to assess the
validity of existing theoretical explanations concerning cartel stability. Therefore, the question
is posed: How do informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope
of formal legal control and what role does trust play?
Based on 14 case studies of Dutch cartels, this article explores how cartels manage to
survive for years despite the threat of cheating and detection; how do firms organise cartels;
and how do they prevent and overcome internal conflicts? Section 2 of the paper discusses
previous studies and theory concerning cartel stability. Section 3 introduces data and the
methods used for this study. Section 4 addresses the internal mechanisms of coordination,
monitoring, compensation, and enforcement in light of the research question. Section 5 deals
with the conclusions, limitations, and possibilities for further research.
To Cheat or not to Cheat: Theoretical Perspectives on Cartel Stability
The Economic Perspective: Stability Through Retaliation
Economic literature on cartels uses a model that departs from the idea of a lack of trust between
member firms. In this model, firms are bound to cheat on the mutual agreement because of
incentives to do so. Economic studies perceive cartels in terms of a game-theoretical problem:
it starts from the idea that cartel participants are motivated instrumentally, and the perceived
costs and benefits are part of a rational assessment. With this comes a focus on incentives for
players in the cartel to cheat, such as overselling or underpricing (Stigler 1968). Firms will do
so in order to maximise individual profits further or to expand market shares beyond the
cartel’s collective agreement. This leads to the perceived ‘inherent instability’ of cartels
(Rapoport and Chammah 1965). This model is vividly illustrated by one of the directors of
ADM in the lysine cartel4: ‘Everybody’s going to want to cheat anyway. Knowing them, we
will want to cheat’ (Leslie 2004: 561; Eichenwald 2001: 220).
In this perspective, cartel stability depends on the perceived losses and profits that result
from cheating in relation to the likelihood of possible punishment from other cartel members.
Therefore, cartelists can only establish stability by means of a system that increases—by way
of internal punishment—the costs of cheating (Spagnolo 2000; Spar 1994). Cartels need to
monitor their agreement to detect cheating and punish firms that practise it (Levenstein and
Suslow 2006; Connor 2001; Ayres 1987). Thus, in order for a cartel to survive, this model
assumes credible punishment should be in place to penalise members that cheat, thereby
4 The international lysine cartel entailed a price-fixing conspiracy between the American food processing
company Archer Daniel Midland and its main Korean and Japanese competitors around the animal feed additive
lysine. Cartelists allegedly managed to raise global prices of lysine by 70% for several years during the mid-
1990s.
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enforcing the cartel agreement (Ayres 1987; Green and Porter 1984; Stigler 1968). Forms of
credible punishments described are price slicing and the threat of price wars (Harrington 2006;
Grossman 1996). For instance, when firms observe cheating by other firms, they lower their
cartel prices temporarily in order to punish possible cheaters and to stabilise the cartel
(Ashenfelter and Graddy 2005).
In short, an economic approach seeks explanations for cartel stability in effective internal
detection and punishment. This introduces the expectation that the cases will demonstrate sophis-
ticated systems of coordination, monitoring, and enforcement. Retaliation in the form of price
slicing and price wars will serve to increase the costs of cheating, thus ultimately stabilising cartels.
Recent empirical studies, find two important issues regarding cartel stability that challenge
the assumptions in the economic model. Firstly, cartels invest more in means to prevent
cheating than to resort to ex post punishments,5 which are costly (Harrington 2006;
Levenstein and Suslow 2006). Secondly, a retaliatory response to cheating increases the
likelihood of a cartel’s natural demise (Levenstein and Suslow 2011). Where strong systems
of monitoring and enforcement are considered to account for cartel stability in the economic
model, empirical results suggest otherwise. The deviating effects of internal punishments leave
room for alternative explanations for the longevity of cartels.
The Social Perspective: Stability Through Mutual Trust
Empirical cartel studies that use a social approach criticise economic assumptions on
behaviour as being too simplistic (Parker 2012). Results from the Melbourne cartel
project6 show the discrepancies between economic assumptions in competition policies
and the social reality of business conduct (Parker 2012; Haines and Beaton-Wells 2012).
A social approach examines the relation between actors rather than focusing on the
individual agent. It considers the actions of individuals to be strongly socially embedded.
A social approach considers cartels in the context of mutual trust, focusing on the
incentives of firms to act cooperatively in the informal setting of cartels. Trust may
provide an important element in explaining how firms manage to operate their cartels for
long periods (Stephan 2010; Leslie 2004), and better account for some of the recent
empirical findings on cartel stability.
Empirical studies using a social approach to cartel stability are scarce, but we can find
similar explanations for cooperative behaviour in studies on legal business conduct in
informal settings; this is referred to as ‘the shadow of the law’. It shows that business
relations are socially embedded and able to generate social norms that make legal sanctions
5 In this regard, I point out the importance of compensation systems, such as side payments and buy-backs. These
are financial compensations or compensations in kind, and serve to even out disparities regarding, for instance,
agreed-upon volumes at the end of the year. I classify them here as a means of coordination in order to regulate
the execution of the agreement and to prevent miscommunications or conflicts. This has to be distinguished from
punishment by retaliation as a response to conflicts.
6 This research project was conducted at the Melbourne Law School by researchers Caron Beaton-Wells, Fiona
Haines, Christine Parker, David Round, and Janette Nankivell. The project studied the process of cartel
criminalisation and the perceptions of the general public and business professionals with regard to cartel conduct.
Researchers used a multidisciplinary approach, including legal and social research methods. For more informa-
tion, see http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/cartel.
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unnecessary and superfluous (Ellickson 1991; Granovetter 1985; Black 1983, 1984;
Macaulay 1963, 2013).7 Scholars in economic sociology have stressed the argument and
the paradox of the social embeddedness of economic action, claiming that the more an
informal economy approaches the model of a ‘true market’, the more it depends on social
ties. Social embeddedness is considered especially visible in a context where mutual trust is
the only resource against malfeasance (Portes 2010; Granovetter 1993). Therefore, in the
absence of enforceable legal protection, personal relations between cartelists are expected to
form an important factor for the internal stability of cartels. Stephan (2010: 361) states:
‘The notion that one should befriend individuals in business and bring them into one’s
home can be an explicit social mechanism for ensuring that an agreement is honored in the
absence of strong legal protection’. Personal relations and interpersonal trust can account
for cartel stability, and three main conditions for interpersonal trust can be identified:
communication, reciprocity and reputation.
Communication Common protocols and frequent communication can play a significant role
in the process of building trust. People who communicate frequently are more likely to
perceive mutual trust (Leslie 2004: 538). Face-to-face meetings and coordination will facilitate
the perception of trustworthiness, thus promoting cooperative behaviour. Just as in the
economic approach, systems of coordination and monitoring are expected here. The social
approach perceives these systems as a symptom of the incentives to cooperate and as a means
to build trust, thus making punishments irrelevant. Moreover, simply allowing discussions and
participating in negotiations increases cooperative behaviour within cartels, creating more
internal support and legitimacy for the agreement and its conditions (Leslie 2004: 544).
Therefore, instead of retaliation, negotiation and mediation are expected in response to mutual
disagreements.
Reciprocity In the operation of cartels, firms will build upon mutual rights and obligations
because of the coordination of agreements and the compensation in light of them (Van de Bunt
2010; Hertogh 2005). This enables norms of generalised reciprocity to develop within the
cartel. Being in debt to others and having others indebted to you affects one’s actions. It is
expected that this creates mutual dependencies between firms, which in turn promotes peaceful
arbitration and discourages cheating, thus ultimately stabilising the cartel.
Reputation A reputation for being trustworthy is crucial in business relations (Van Erp
2008). One’s promise of trustworthiness must be credible, as trust is a function of expectations
(Leslie 2004: 540). Having a shared past serves as input for this reputation, and having a
shared future creates a need for it, again giving firms an interest in handling their relations in a
harmonious manner. The desire for a positive reputation encourages parties to avoid mutual
conflict or retaliation (Posner 2009). Retaliation, such as price wars, can be an expensive piece
of ‘equipment’ in business relations. Firms thrive on being perceived by others as being a
trustworthy, cooperative and reasonable partner.
7 The ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organisations has also been defined
as social capital by a group of influential scholars within the field of sociology (Coleman 1988; Fukuyama 1995;
Putnam 1995). Fukuyama (1997: 378–9) says: ‘Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain
set of informal values or norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them (…) the
norms (…) include virtues like truth-telling, the meeting of obligations, and reciprocity’. Putnam (2000; 19) also
stresses the importance of norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from social networks.
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Table 1 depicts the two explanatory models of cartel stability. Both approaches expect
similar organisation within cartels: namely, systems of coordination and monitoring. However,
they foresee different responses in light of internal cheating: the economic approach expects
retaliation and the social approach anticipates negotiation. The models contain ideal types, the
cases that are studied and discussed are viewed in regard to these models to assess which
elements they contain in practice.
Methods and Data Sources
This article examines cartel stability based on a qualitative case file analysis of 14 Dutch cases.
In these cases, the Dutch Competition Authority imposed an administrative fine between
October 2007 and January 2012.8 These cases were selected because reports that led to a fine
contain substantial proof, including documentation on coordination and communication within
cartels. This documentation allowed for a systematic and in-depth study of the structure and
nature of cartels. The 14 cases were examined using document analysis and semi-structured
interviews with case managers from the Authority for Consumers and Markets. The sources
are official reports by the authority,9 summarising the files and containing a selection of
evidence used in administrative proceedings towards administrative fines imposed upon
corporations. These files contain descriptions of the modus operandi of cartels, and include
correspondence between their members; transcriptions of verbal interrogations with corporate
officials by the competition authority; and sources of cartel administration. These statements
are supported by additional written administration. The material was systematically studied
using a checklist, focusing on the type of network; the nature of mutual relations; mechanisms
for mutual control; mechanisms for mutual trust; and instances of cheating and conflicts. For
every case, the document analysis was complemented with a semi-structured interview with
the project manager of the authority that handled the investigation. In these interviews, the
following topics were discussed: the nature of the cartel; mechanisms for mutual control and
trust; and instances of cheating and mutual conflicts. These interviews served to provide a
better overview of the files and an opportunity to ask additional questions that could not be
answered in full through studying the written reports.
The use of secondary sources leads to several limitations of this study. Because of detection
and enforcement biases, the cases do not necessarily provide a representative image of all
cartel conduct in the Netherlands. Some cartels have greater chances of being detected, and
cases that involve substantial proof will have a greater chance of ultimately resulting in an
administrative fine. The statements of corporate officials referred to in this article, originate
from secondary sources and therefore might express firms’ perspectives, but were originally
made in the course of an administrative procedure. Note that one of the formal legal
8 Commissioning administrative fines is one of the possible sanctions authorised by Dutch competition law
(according to Art. 56 lid 1 sub a Mw). Since October 2007, Dutch competition law allows the investigation of
private property and the possibility of fining natural persons (Kamerstukken I 2006/07, 30 071, A). October 2007
is the starting point of the analysis for the sake of comparability of the material. January 2012 is indicated as end
date because cases usually take several years from the initial investigation until the official sanction; all cases
completed by January 2012 have been included.
9 These files are a result of investigations based on the legal power invested in the Dutch competition authority to
interrogate corporate officials and demand corporate intelligence (Art. 5:16 Awb), to investigate company and
private property and administration (Art. 5:15, art. 54, 55 Mw), and to use leniency requests and other relevant
informants and public information.
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requirements of finding a person or corporation guilty of an infringement is that the effects of
the infringement must be ‘noticeable’; have a significant effect on the market. This might lead
some of the corporate officials to deny the ‘real’ effect of any agreements made, as a legal
defence strategy, or to under-report their conduct in general. Table 2 presents descriptive
information on the selected cases, including the cartel’s duration,10 number of firms, and nature
of the conduct.11 The relatively high number of firms in these cases can be biased because of
three main issues. Firstly, cartels with an active industry association have a greater chance of
detection. Secondly, cartels with a more limited number of firms may conspire more effec-
tively, with little chance of detection. Thirdly, an effective cartel may have a self-amplifying
effect; the collusion can offer more firms an opportunity to survive.
The Dutch cases in this study have an average duration of about five years, which is
comparable to the typical duration of cartels (Levenstein and Suslow 2006, 2011). This
duration shows that firms manage to stabilise their cartel for several years, which indicates a
form of stability and effective coordination. Besides duration, most of the cases involve a large
number of participating firms. For instance, 15 firms were involved in cases 7 and 9. It
indicates the need for systems of communication and monitoring in coordinating collective
action in cartels.
Table 2 also states the nature of the conduct. Three main categories are distinguished: bid-
rigging, price-fixing and market division or allocation. Based on legal definitions, these serve
as a descriptive label, indicating the main category of the infringement, though these categories
are not mutually exclusive per se. Bid-rigging involves firms in a tendering procedure,
communicating before the bidding takes place. They divide the work and rotate bids, thereby
10 To determine the duration of these cartels, the period of the continuous infringement stated in the report is
used. This also means that the period before the introduction of the Dutch cartel prohibition (January 1998) is not
incorporated in determining the duration. This suggests an underestimation of the actual duration of the cartel.
This effect is enhanced by the internal selection bias of the competition authority concerning the minimum
standards regarding evidence.
11 In light of confidentiality, the industry in which the cartels took place cannot be indicated per case in Table 2.
The cases took place in the following industries; construction (6); heavy industry (3); general services industry
(2); forestry (1); waste disposal (1); and financial services (1).
Table 1 Two ideal typical explanatory models of cartel stability
Model Economic approach Social approach
Underlying behavioural
assumptions
Instrumentally oriented
economic action:
-Instrumentally motivated actors
-Mutual lack of trust central
-Focuses on the incentives to cheat:
--maximise profits
--expand markets
Socially oriented economic action:
-Normatively motivated actors
-Mutual trust central
-Focuses on the incentives to cooperate:
--value introjection
Organisation of cartels As a result of lack of trust and
incentives to cheat:
-Systems of coordination and monitoring
As a result of social ties, means to build
trust, and the incentives to cooperate:
-Systems of coordination and monitoring
Expected response
to cheating
Punishment/retaliation Mediation/negotiation
Expected outcome Forced compliance of cheating firm
to original agreement, or exclusion
of cheater
Adjusted agreement
and/or compensation scheme and
continuation of the cartel
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rigging the procedure. Also known as collusive tendering, it generally involves raising price
offers to the buyer. In price-fixing cartels, firms make explicit agreements on the price or
surcharge of a particular product or service. Firms will use, for instance, minimum pricelists.
The other cases are market division or allocation. In these cartels, firms agree to fix market
shares or divide markets into geographical regions.
Managing Cartels in the Absence of Formal Legal Control
To analyse which elements of the two approaches occur in the cases, they are discussed in light
of the explanatory model provided in Section 2: respectively, the organisation of cartels, the
responses to cheating and conflicts, and the outcome of these responses.
The Organisation of Cartels: Systems of Coordination, Compensation
and Monitoring
Cartel stability is enabled by systems of coordination, compensation and monitoring in all
cases, as expected from both the economic and the social approach. Bid-rigging cartels use
cover pricing and phases-of-the-moon systems. Firms inform each other on new incoming
requests from potential and existing clients, while others respond when they receive the same
request. Agreements are made on a specific project, and firms divide the work, communicating
their prices and offers prior to submitting them in a tender procedure. They typically agree on
who will obtain the tender, and the rest will submit a higher price. The firms themselves often
document divided projects and clients. Based on this overview, theymake use of compensations
to even out disparities. To do this, firms can use false invoices, by which goods and services are
billed that did not actually take place. In some cases, discounts for mutual deliveries are used to
compensate. In addition, some bid-rigging cartels use a phases-of-the-moon system to decide
Table 2 Descriptive information on selected cartel cases
Case # Duration in
years
Number of
firms
Nature of the
conduct
Collective
market share
Case 1 6 9 Market division 70%
Case 2 8 9 Price-fixing 85-90%
Case 3 6 8 Bid-rigging 60-80%
Case 4 6 5 Market division 60-80%
Case 5 6 5 Bid-rigging -
Case 6 1 9 Bid-rigging -
Case 7 7 15 Market division 90%
Case 8 1 2 Bid-rigging -
Case 9 6 15 Market division 87.3%
Case 10 1.5 4 Price-fixing 58%
Case 11 2 3 Bid-rigging 85-95%
Case 12 9 14 Bid-rigging -
Case 13 3.5 10 Market allocation -
Case 14 11 4 Market allocation 35-50%
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whose turn it is to acquire the next project or client. It is a form of bid rotation by taking turns.
Less communication is needed this way, leading to less potential written evidence of commu-
nication. Here is an example of how such a system can operate:
‘We kept an overview in Excel. It was quite simple. Name of the tender, names of the
suppliers [cartelists], their prices and the name of who got the tender. Those firms
involved in the specific tender kept score, they noted the price on which the tender was
assigned. An example: if there were three suppliers, one would have received work for
€70,000, the other for €80,000 and the third for €30,000; then the next project would be
for the one with €30,000. The lowest in the list came first.’ (5)
There are also instances of cover pricing; purposely submitting a higher price than
other firms. This is also referred to as ‘borrowing prices’ or courtesy bidding, which
is used to stay in the loop and remain visible to potential clients, while lacking the
capacity to actually execute the work. Cover pricing is a form of bid-rigging that
takes place more decentralised and ad hoc.
Price-fixing cartels usually organise a number of meetings to set minimum prices or
increase prices regarding a certain product or service. Minimum pricelists and standard client
letters are used. In one example, producers meet twice a year to discuss and fix prices. As well
as the means to increase prices, cartel members also discuss the timing of announcing the
surcharge.
Other cases include market division cartels, dividing market shares and geographical
allocation. These cartels use client lists, turnover lists, market-sharing lists, and geographical
distributions. Dividing clients, often referred to by firms as ‘respecting clients’, is most
common among the selected cases. One of the cartelists explains the use of client lists as
follows:
‘Goal of the list is to respect each others’ A-relation customers. This means that if I
received an order from someone else’s A-relation client, I at least had to apply the price
lists. And we did. The other one would then have the possibility to underprice that offer
to manipulate the order in their direction’. (1)
Cartels show a learning ability when it comes to effective coordination. In the next
example, firms develop and professionalise their coordination system through trial and error.
Initially they have a simple system: firms report orders of a certain size at a central contact
point, discuss who is to be given the order and divide the work accordingly. However, as in
most of the cases, firms need some form of compensation to even out disparities that would
build up over time and were not in line with the mutual agreement. To compensate for this,
firms would prefer orders, but sometimes also needed to apply financial transactions.
However, this led to practical issues resulting in a flexible compensation rule, noted in the
minutes of one of their meetings. This example illustrates how cartelists manage to negotiate a
solution as well as how firms choose the desire for stability over financial gain:
‘Because no member of the cartel could ever deliver exactly in accordance with the pre-
establishedmarket shares, and it is considered undesirable for members to transfer money
to one another as if they were bankers, an agreement is established including that
compensation is not needed for over- or under-exceeding 5% of the market share’. (4)
Other cases also illustrate this point. In case 14, firms divided national regions, and every
cartelist was committed to refer potential clients to the firm that was active in that area.
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However, firms did not always succeed in referring clients. If clients went against being
referred, the firm that originally received the order accepted the offer, hereby violating the
original allocation agreement. For this situation, the cartel introduced a rule: if a client from
another region was contracted, the firm owed 2% of that contract to the cartelist who ‘owned’
that region. Cases 4 and 14 are good illustrations of the coordination process in most cases, for
two reasons. Firstly, it shows how parties can prevent resentment or conflicts by compensating
according to what is perceived as ‘just’. Secondly, it demonstrates how cartelists evaluate and
negotiate in order to establish internal rules and agreements. Both examples of the informal
rules that emerge from collective bargaining in the absence of formal legal means. Cartel rules
can clearly be a result of social norms in a sector, as in the example of ‘respecting clients’.
Furthermore, the coordination process highlights the significance of communication and
reciprocity. It illustrates how informal social rules can function as a far more powerful system
to govern business conduct then formal legal rules (cf. Macaulay 1963). This also facilitates
cartel stability, and makes internal punishment or retaliation less likely or irrelevant.
However, cartelists do monitor their agreements, which indicates some skepticism of firms
with respect to the level of trust. We can distinguish different functions of these informal
control mechanisms: firms collect information on the actions of other participants in the cartel;
assess whether it is in line with the agreement; and decide what type of response should be
applied to the cheating party. Cartels use two main mechanisms to monitor the agreement:
meetings for reporting sales figures and so on, and independent administrators. In most cases,
cartelists use some form of reporting figures, such as turnover, market shares, and prices. A
managing director explains which issues are dealt with in these meetings:
‘This was an evaluation meeting in which the outcome of dealer negotiations was
addressed. Amongst other things, the following questions were dealt with: Did everyone
manage to retain their clients? Did clients leave? Was an increase in prices established?’
(2)
Firms mention the social control function of cartel meetings. In the next example, one of the
participants explains how meetings—in theory—would be superfluous. His statement, how-
ever, indicates the skepticism that most cartelists hold towards others’ complying with the
agreements:
‘The role of pricelists is that they contain the price upon which others should overcharge
in formulating their offer. Actually, the meetings would not have been necessary if every
member had just abided by the pricelists, because that was defining.’ (4)
Some cartels also use independent—third-party—administrators, sometimes referred to as a
cartel ‘secretary’. They are often retired executives, familiar with the market. They arrange
practical matters, look after administration, and lead discussions or negotiations. One of these
‘secretaries’ explained that he organised the meetings, made reservations for venues, paid
expenses in advance, took minutes of the meetings, and kept score of the general turnover
numbers. Being an independent ‘fixer’, a secretary often functions not only as an administrator
but also as an informal auditor. He monitors the cartel and fulfils a role in preventing possible
disagreements or in mediating in the case of conflicts.
Firms are capable of coordinating and compensating in good standing and through collec-
tive bargaining within cartels. However, signs of informal control indicate a certain lack of
trust. Notable from these examples is that, because of their need to operate underground,
cartelists have to rely heavily on informal means of coordination as expected from the paradox
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of social embeddedness (Portes 2010). At the same time, however, cartelists tend to formalise
their interactions heavily by clandestine bookkeeping, minutes of meetings and rules on
mutual compensation. It remains unclear whether this is a function of trust or a lack of it.
Responses: Cheating, Discussion and Conflict
With internal monitoring also comes information on the behaviour of other cartelists. This
information sometimes reveals cheating by one or more cartel members. When parties do not
communicate regularly, suspicions of cheating arise, resulting in mutual disagreements and
irritation. One of the firms openly raised questions on the level of internal compliance in the
cartel in the following example, documented in internal correspondence between cartel members:
‘Member[name club], [C] is right—we report everything that has to be reported, but we
also observe from the order of the numbers [phases-of-the-moon system] that there seem
to be only two companies that still report. The rest of them do nothing or keep quiet.
Especially now, when times are tough, it is useful and necessary that we keep in touch
(…). That’s what we agreed upon. Or is [serial number of environmental certification
these companies require to do business in this market] the end-all of the [name club]?
This can’t be true. Show some personality and guts—this attitude leads to nothing, to
nothing at all.’ (3)
Third-party fixers also notice internal struggles that occur in the context of collective
meetings. The ‘secretary’ in the following example explains how he had a mitigating role in
a dispute that derived from episodes of mutual cheating:
‘I would tell them to stop arguing. (…) I believe that firms deviated a lot from the
established pricelists. Everyone did. One would be left with the impression "they
exchange everything, we all go home, and everyone does something else instead^’. (4)
In addition to third-party fixers, other cartel participants can fulfil a conciliatory role in the
event of internal disagreements. A managing director explains:
‘Arguments could escalate quickly because somebody had taken someone else’s A-
relation customer, for instance. If others saw this happening, they would adopt the role
of mediator between parties in the meeting’. (1)
The next example also shows how firms can overcome conflicts bilaterally through
communicating and showing a willingness to settle. This is a segment of a wiretapped
conversation between cartelists as part of a police file, also used in the administrative
procedure by the Dutch competition authority. It reflects a conversation held after an episode
of cheating on the agreement by one of the parties:
‘[A:] Guys, if this is the way we are going to do business, every man for himself, you
know what’s going to happen, right? The price will only go down and, well, quite
frankly, I can of course go way down. I don’t want to do this, but you just wait and see
[B:]. You know, let us be wise. We should just return to the way we did business before,
in everybody’s best interest. We should take for granted that mistakes will be made, but
we should set aside our feelings and trust each other’s word’. (12)
These cases show how cheating is noticed by others in the cartel, and can lead to
disagreements. However, cheating can also occur without being detected. In the following
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example, one of the cartelists explains how they would manipulate the information presented
to others:
‘It was a statement of the auditor that indicated how many square metres [name
company] had supplied in the previous year. We would manipulate this statement and
present it in the meeting. We blurred out the [type of product] that wasn’t relevant to the
cartel. We would leave the total amount, but replace the attachments with the amounts
we had reported earlier’. (1).
These four cases demonstrate that despite sophisticated coordination systems, cheating
occurs and can result in conflict. Although negotiations and mediating ‘fixers’ can help to
overcome most conflicts, thus stabilising the cartel, in some cases this does not suffice. The
following example, also from case 1, shows how multiple attempts to overcome a lack of trust
can ultimately fail. One of the managing directors provides a brief history of the cartel’s
internal struggles:
‘In the autumn of 2002, the tension between [V] and [B] escalated again. [B] was
accused in connection with several matters. I had a conversation on this matter with [V].
As a result of this conversation, [V] even called a director of [B]. I was upset about this,
and then ended everything in December. (…) I think [V] eventually apologised in, I
think, March 2003. We then sat back at the negotiation table. Everything was already
falling apart anyway; [B] was doing his own thing. There had been a meeting in April
2003, and we concluded: BGuys, we have to stop. This is pointless.^ The stupid thing
was that you were better off if you weren’t sitting at the table, because then you wouldn’t
have to decrease your volume of production. As the biggest party, [V] had the greatest
interest in keeping the thing together. You would have a really disproportional atten-
dance at the table. We then finally quit.’ (1)
Outcome: Breaking up is Hard
Based on the documents and the interviews with enforcement officials, it is not
always possible to determine whether cartels in the selected cases actually ceased
their activities, and, if so, whether this took place before, during or after the
administrative procedures. As previously mentioned, however, ‘internal violations’
involving cartel agreements are mostly resolved at an early stage, ex ante, by mutual
compensations, negotiations and mediation. In the last example, we saw how cheating
could eventually lead to the demise of the cartel.
Nevertheless, based on the case material, there is reason to believe that on numerous
occasions ending the cartel was not an easy decision. It was rarely due to explicit pressure
and intimidation, and more often because of existing loyalties towards ‘co-competitors’, as
illustrated by a quote from one of the directors:
‘Again, I declare that we decided internally, with the introduction of the new Dutch
competition law, to cease our activities. We did not succeed. We should have distanced
ourselves from these activities. I urged this several times and was sometimes pressured
by other firms to continue with the agreements. (12)
This example underlines what other scholars have pointed out: taking part in
cartels is not a voluntary and purely instrumental decision, but is embedded in social
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reality that includes existing loyalties to industry peers in markets and within firms
(Parker 2012). Breaking with the cartel was often also difficult because of the mutual
dependencies that had evolved as a result of working closely with others for years.
When one relies on informal systems and methods for doing business, it is not easy
to reject them overnight for the sake of continuation of your business. This is
illustrated in the following example:
‘Recently I have said "no" on five or six occasions; the reason for saying "yes"
again to future agreements [collusive tendering] was that I would also be
included in the market if they received an order. If I say "no" too often, I’m
sure to be excluded by them in the future. If I say "yes", however, this also
creates possibilities for me. It’s give-and-take in this business’. (12)
Reciprocity is a powerful market mechanism. It means that one might become a
‘prisoner’ of the system, entangled in mutual rights and obligations that make it
harder to say goodbye (Van de Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2005). The uncertainty of a
competitive market—smaller margins, downward price levels and so on—can also
function as a push factor into continuing the cartel. This can result in cartelists, that
had become competitors, to become cartelists again. This is illustrated by the follow-
ing example:
‘In March 2003 we as a company said "we should stop". It was illegal then, and
it’s illegal now. We have to learn to reason from the cost price plus leeway.
After the summer of 2003 (fall) [company B] frontally attacked [company A].
[A] counter-attacked. Prices dropped dramatically and [A] yielded in a lot of
orders that autumn. Then [B] took the initiative again to sit back at the
negotiating table and said this was not workable; we are giving away everything
to the market’. (1)
Conclusions
This study highlights how firms in the selected cases manage their cartels in the
absence of law. The focus of this article has been on the internal structure of cartels,
with regard to how firms are able to stabilise their cartel. The research question was
How do informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope of
formal legal control and what role does trust play? Two different perspectives were
identified in the existing literature: an economic approach departing from the assump-
tion of a lack of trust and a need for monitoring and retaliation, and a social approach
departing from the assumption of mutual trust and the use of negotiation and
mediation. Elements from both ideal types occurred in the selected cases.
On the one hand, the cases demonstrate the importance of informal social mech-
anisms for the ‘successful’ operation of cartels. Means of coordination and compen-
sation—meetings, informal rules, and mutual debts—were established between firms
through communication and reciprocity. The cases thereby confirmed the paradox of
social embeddedness: namely, the need to operate secretly forces cartelists to rely
heavily on social ties through informal means of coordination. Furthermore, mutual
rights and obligations make parties interdependent, and reciprocity can function as a
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powerful market mechanism. This stabilises and strengthens cartels, and makes it hard
for firms to end existing agreements.12
On the other hand, third-party auditors and the formalisation of agreements in writing also
indicate a lack of trust: conflicts occurred in some cases, and parties sometimes responded
through retaliation. However, retaliation appears more likely to lead to the end of the cartel
rather than stabilising it. In light of conflicts, the dominant strategy seems to be not to punish
other cartel members. In contrast, firms are often able to overcome mutual disagreements by
means of negotiation and compensation. Moreover, most cases do not involve explicit
episodes of conflict, confirming the preventative effect imposed by the systems of coordination
and compensation. This is comparable to findings on drug markets, where retaliation is found
to be a costly business tool and negotiation and toleration are common (Jacques and Wright
2008, 2011; Zaitch 2005).
The results emphasise that in order to explain cartel stability we need to consider the
social embeddedness and the importance of social mechanisms that induce trust. Trust and a
lack of trust both play a role in how firms manage and shape their cartels. In a theoretical
sense, it remains a chicken and egg situation, because the formalisation of cartel agree-
ments—clandestine bookkeeping, minutes of meetings, and rules on mutual compensa-
tions—can express both mutual trust or a lack of it. Both elements are clearly hard to
disentangle, and such an exercise harms the complexity of the social reality of cartels. In this
regard, the economic approach overlooks the fact that—given the participants’ proper
response—conflicts can prove to be an opportunity to strengthen the cartel, and they pan
out to be a source of stability instead of instability. This is also referred to as the ‘cleansing’
function of social conflicts (Coser 1956). In these cases, cartels will be more difficult to
break up, even when facing the threat of formal legal control (enforcement) or changing
market conditions (Levenstein and Suslow 2011).
The results illustrate the importance of mutual dependencies between competitors and the
use of informal social mechanisms to build trust and to stabilise cartels. This enables even
relatively large groups of firms to cooperate effectively (e.g. case 12, 14 firms and a duration of
nine years, case 7, 15 firms and a duration of seven years). The cases thereby show how an
economic model provides an incomplete explanation for cartel stability and calls for incorpo-
rating a different approach to explain how cartel stability operates. Furthermore, this calls for
incorporating a social perspective in competition law and policy, in which the influence of
economic assumptions is widespread.
Limitations
It is difficult to determine the perspective of cartelists when their statements and testimonies
have to be derived from secondary sources collected in the context of administrative proce-
dures. Some issues, therefore—such as the significance of reputation—are less well docu-
mented. The data also did not always provide a definitive answer to whether the detected cartel
had actually ended. This is an important question, because there is reason to believe that
mutual conflicts and detection can also give rise to cartels beginning or starting anew. This
12 In addition to these findings, it is noted that social capital, strong social ties and trust are often considered
desirable in light of growth and economic value (cf. De Bliek 2015). However, these mechanisms can also have
less desirable consequences. The strong ties in a social group such as a business cartel can benefit its members
but exclude others from access. Moreover, it can limit and restrict the individual freedom of its members (Parker
2012; Portes 2010: 39).
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could indicate a learning ability in prosecuted firms in addition to a ‘stronger-through-conflict’
cooperation with other firms in their market. Large-scale cartel recidivism on an international
and European level also supports this view (Connor and Helmers 2007; Connor 2010).
However, the level of recidivism is yet to be established with regard to the Dutch situation,
and more careful consideration of the ‘cleansing function of social conflict’ is needed.
This article has discussed only the internal threat of cheating within cartels. Other threats,
like defection by insiders (whistleblowers) or detection by outsiders, have not been addressed.
The material on detected cartels does not provide this inside information on considerations of
firms that blew the whistle on the cartel in exchange for immunity or a waiver of prosecution.
Another issue raised by this study concerns the strain between concealment of conduct and
coordination, as was pointed out by the formalisation of agreements through minutes of
meetings, bookkeeping and so on. Communication and exchanges between firms in a cartel
are underestimated (Grout and Sonderegger 2005). Communication seems to play a significant
role in cartel stability, which might suggest that cartelists will engage in overtly collusive
practices, in contrast to what might be expected from their need to conceal their cartel. This
generates further questions surrounding cartel stability; for instance, what will prevail—the
need to coordinate or the need to conceal? For further research on these issues, it is
recommended to interview insiders such as compliance officers, in-house or external lawyers,
or general managers of businesses confronted by or involved in cartel infringements.
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